J&R Ice Cream Corp. v. California Smoothie Licens. Corp. by unknown
1994 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
8-4-1994 
J&R Ice Cream Corp. v. California Smoothie Licens. Corp. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1994 
Recommended Citation 
"J&R Ice Cream Corp. v. California Smoothie Licens. Corp." (1994). 1994 Decisions. 102. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1994/102 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 1994 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
1 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
               
 
Nos. 93-5516 and 93-5547 
               
 
J & R ICE CREAM CORPORATION,  
a Corporation of the State of Florida 
     
  v. 
 
CALIFORNIA SMOOTHIE LICENSING CORPORATION,  
a Corporation of the State of New Jersey;  
CALIFORNIA SMOOTHIE INTERNATIONAL, INC.,  
a Corporation of the State of New Jersey, 
 
     Defendants/Third-Party   




JEFFREY K. BAUGHER; 
RICHARD ROSSETTI, 
 
     Third-Party Defendants 
               
 
California Smoothie Licensing Corporation 
and California Smoothie International, Inc., 
 
     Appellants-Cross-Appellees 
 
J & R Ice Cream Corporation, 
 
     Appellee-Cross-Appellant 
 
                   
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civ. No. 89-4638) 
               
 
Argued June 23, 1994 
 
BEFORE:  GREENBERG and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges,  
and FARNAN, District Judge* 
 
(Filed:  August 4, 1994) 
2 
               
 
* Honorable Joseph J. Farnan, Jr., United States District Judge 
for the District of Delaware, sitting by designation.   
    
                    
 
     Samuel B. Santo, Jr. (argued)  
     Gregory B. Reilly 
     Lowenstein, Sandler, Kohl,   
   Fisher & Boylan 
     65 Livingston Avenue 
     Roseland, N.J. 07068 
 
          Attorneys for Appellants- 
          Cross-Appellees 
          California Smoothie 
          Licensing Corp. and 
          California Smoothie 
          International, Inc. 
 
     Brian P. Sullivan (argued) 
     Jay M. Zuckerman 
     Smith, Stratton, Wise, Heher &  
    Brennan 
     600 College Road East 
     Suite 4200 
     Princeton, N.J. 08540 
          
          Attorneys for Appellee- 
          Cross-Appellant J & R 
          Ice Cream Corporation 
                      
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
               
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 A. Factual History 
 This appeal arises from an unsuccessful attempt of a 
franchisee to operate a restaurant in Florida.  The appellants-
cross-appellees are California Smoothie International, Inc.       
(CSI) and its wholly-owned subsidiary, California Smoothie 
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Licensing Corporation (CSLC).  As a matter of convenience, we 
sometimes will refer to CSI and CSLC singularly as "California 
Smoothie".  CSI owns and operates California Smoothie 
restaurants, and CSLC franchises California Smoothie restaurants. 
The appellee-cross-appellant is J & R Ice Cream Corporation, the 
franchisee, which Jeffrey Baugher and Richard Rossetti founded in 
1984.  We note that in the business, restaurants sometimes are 
called "stores" and thus we will use that term. 
 We recite the facts taken from the perspective of J & R 
Ice Cream as the verdict winner.  Baugher and Rossetti are 
longtime friends who decided in the 1980's to open an ice cream 
shop together.  Soon after incorporating J & R Ice Cream for that 
purpose, they decided that to secure a desirable location and 
financing, they would try to acquire a franchise.  They initiated 
preliminary discussions with a number of franchisors, including 
Frusen Gladje and Steve's Ice Cream.  However, during the summer 
of 1985, Robert Keilt, a childhood acquaintance of the Baugher 
and Rossetti families who was the president of CSI and CSLC, 
learned from Baugher's brother that Baugher and Rossetti were 
considering acquiring a franchise.  Subsequently, Joseph Kennedy, 
vice president of franchising and development for CSLC, contacted 
Baugher and suggested that they consider acquiring a California 
Smoothie franchise in the Boca Town Center in Boca Raton, 
Florida.  Baugher agreed to attend a meeting at California 
Smoothie's headquarters in Clifton, New Jersey, to discuss that 
possibility.  Prior to the meeting, California Smoothie sent 
Baugher brochures regarding California Smoothie franchises which 
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contained representations concerning California Smoothie's 
expertise in site selection. 
 The first meeting regarding the acquisition of a 
California Smoothie franchise by Baugher and Rossetti was on 
August 8, 1985.  On that date, Baugher met first with Kennedy, 
then with Keilt, and then with Kennedy again.  According to 
Baugher, in their initial discussions Kennedy told him that the 
average California Smoothie franchise accrued $300,000 in sales 
per year, that a store at the Boca Town Center would produce at 
least that level of sales and probably more, and that all 
existing stores were earning between 18 and 20 percent profit. 
Baugher then met with Keilt who reiterated Kennedy's 
representations.  Finally, when Baugher met with Kennedy again 
after speaking with Keilt, Kennedy gave Baugher documents 
containing sales and profit figures for California Smoothie 
company-owned stores earning substantial profits.  Some of the 
documents contained a "disclaimer" stating that prospective 
franchisees should not rely on the figures.  Nonetheless, Kennedy 
told Baugher to ignore the disclaimer because it was merely a 
legal requirement.  Kennedy also told Baugher that the 
distribution of the documents containing sales and profit figures 
to prospective franchisees violated FTC regulations and 
California Smoothie policy.  Moreover, he gave Baugher CSLC's 
Uniform Offering Circular, which included the following 
statement: 
 [t]he Franchisor does not disclose to 
prospective Franchisees the actual, average 
or projected sales, profits or earnings of 
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existing California Smoothie restaurants.  In 
the event that a prospective Franchisee 
should obtain such information, it should not 
be relied upon, since any information 
pertaining to sales, profits, or earnings is 
intended for internal use only as a basis for 
the Franchisor's management decisions. 
Uniform Offering Circular § 19, app. at 105. 
 The second meeting regarding the acquisition of a 
California Smoothie franchise by Baugher and Rossetti involved 
Rossetti and California Smoothie representatives, James Skouras 
and Gary Goddard.  Goddard assured Rossetti that he and Baugher 
could match the profit and sales figures on certain documents 
Goddard showed him.  There was a third meeting on August 26, 
1985, when Baugher met with Keilt and Skouras who suggested that 
Baugher consider the Pompano Fashion Square Shopping Center site 
in Pompano Beach, Florida, for a franchise and indicated that a 
store at that site would have sales in excess of $300,000 per 
year. 
 In September 1985, Baugher and Rossetti submitted 
franchise applications to California Smoothie, expressing 
interest in acquiring a franchise at the Boca Raton site.  On 
November 22, 1985, California Smoothie notified Baugher and 
Rossetti that their applications had been approved.  However, 
shortly thereafter California Smoothie informed them that Keilt 
had decided not to locate a "full-line-menu" restaurant at the 
Boca Town Center due to the lease economics of the site.0 
                     
0California Smoothie Restaurants served items including pita 
sandwiches, yogurt and blended fruit drinks.  Their menus varied, 
however, from full-line menus including the greatest variety of 
products, to menus limited almost exclusively to the California 
Smoothie blended fruit drinks. 
6 
Meanwhile, in November 1985, CSI leased space in the food court 
scheduled to open at the Pompano Fashion Square Shopping Center 
some time in 1986.  In late December 1985, Keilt and Skouras 
contacted Baugher and Rossetti and told them that a store at the 
Pompano mall would produce at least $300,000 in sales per year. 
Moreover, Keilt told Baugher that California Smoothie had 
conducted a full investigation of the Pompano mall site, 
including studies of demographic information. 
 Baugher and Rossetti retained an accountant, Thomas 
Maniscalo, to evaluate the Pompano mall site and to help them get 
financing should they choose to acquire a California Smoothie 
franchise.  Maniscalo had several conversations with Keilt and 
another representative of California Smoothie, who indicated to 
him the level of gross sales and expenses associated with a 
franchise.  In these discussions, the California Smoothie 
representatives understated the expenses and failed to mention 
that certain California Smoothie restaurants were operating at a 
loss or had closed due to financial failure.  Based on the 
misleading information he received, Maniscalo advised Baugher and 
Rossetti to acquire the Pompano mall California Smoothie 
franchise. 
 On January 28, 1986, Baugher and Rossetti entered into 
a site selection agreement with CSLC, and made a $5,000 
downpayment on CSLC's $25,000 franchise fee.  Subsequently, on 
February 21, 1986, Baugher and Rossetti paid the remaining 
$20,000 of the franchise fee and executed a franchise agreement 
and a sublease entitling and obligating them to operate a 
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California Smoothie Restaurant at the site leased by CSI in the 
food court at the Pompano mall.  Prior to executing these 
agreements, Baugher and Rossetti expressed concern that the lease 
negotiated by CSI with the Pompano mall's landlord did not 
contain a cap on the common area maintenance fees.  Indeed, 
California Smoothie's guidelines indicated that common area 
maintenance fees for a food court should not exceed two per cent 
of gross sales.  Keilt responded to their concern by stating that 
he and the landlord had reached an oral agreement providing that 
common area maintenance fees would not exceed three percent of 
gross sales.   
 Baugher and Rossetti opened their California Smoothie 
restaurant at the Pompano mall on June 8, 1986, and on August 6, 
1986, they assigned their rights in the franchise agreement to  J 
& R Ice Cream.  By the end of 1986, the franchise was operating 
at a loss.  Baugher and Rossetti complained to CSLC about their 
gross sales and about the level of the food court maintenance 
fees which the mall collected from food court tenants.0  These 
fees totaled more than the promised three percent of the 
restaurant's gross sales.  After unsuccessfully seeking a 
reduction in the fees from the agent representing the mall's 
landlord, CSLC filed a lawsuit against the landlord and its agent 
in a Florida state court, alleging that the agent had made 
material misrepresentations to CSI during the lease negotiations. 
                     
0The mall's landlord assessed CSI for the food court maintenance 
fees, and then CSI assessed Baugher and Rossetti for them 
pursuant to the sublease. 
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At that time, CSI began making reduced rent payments to the 
landlord and, in turn, began collecting reduced rent payments 
from J & R Ice Cream.   
 However, in October 1988, when settlement negotiations 
between CSI and the landlord proved unsuccessful, CSLC demanded 
that J & R Ice Cream pay the full amount owed under the sublease, 
including all past-due amounts.  But J & R Ice Cream refused to 
pay the full amount due and continued to make reduced rent 
payments.  J & R Ice Cream incurred losses in 1987, 1988, and 
1989.  On November 6, 1989, J & R Ice Cream brought suit against 
CSI and CSLC.  Subsequently, in December 1989, CSLC terminated J 
& R Ice Cream's franchise, and in February 1990, J & R Ice Cream 
gave CSLC notice of its intent to abandon the premises and cease 
operations, and it did so by March 1990.   
 
 B. Procedural History  
 As we have indicated, J & R Ice Cream filed the 
complaint in this diversity of citizenship action on November 6, 
1989.  The complaint alleged violations of the Florida Franchise 
law, the Florida Business Opportunity Law, the Florida Deceptive 
and Unfair Trade Practices Act, the New York Consumer Protection 
from Deceptive Practices Act, and the New Jersey Consumer Fraud 
Act.  See app. at 6-10, 12-15.  The complaint also contained an 
equitable fraud count and a count alleging that California 
Smoothie was negligent in its selection of the Pompano mall site 
and its negotiation of the lease there.  Id. at 11-12, 15-17.  At 
a settlement conference in early August 1991, the district court 
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indicated that it would entertain choice-of-law motions, but not 
motions for summary judgment.  Later that month, the parties 
filed choice-of-law motions and ultimately the court ruled that 
New Jersey law governed the action.  Thus, the claims under 
Florida and New York law were dismissed.  In September 1992, the 
parties consented to a jury trial before a magistrate judge.  The 
trial began in the district court on May 3, 1993.  Before the 
court submitted the case to the jury, J & R Ice Cream decided to 
forego its equitable fraud claim, and thus the court submitted 
only the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act claim and the negligence 
claim to the jury.   
 On May 19, 1993, the jury found that CSI and CSLC 
violated the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act by: (1) representing 
to J & R Ice Cream, without a reasonable basis in fact, that J & 
R would accrue gross sales of no less than $250,000 in its first 
year of operation at the Pompano location, and was likely to 
accrue more than $300,000 in gross sales; (2) representing, 
without a reasonable basis in fact, that they had acquired 
expertise in selecting profitable locations for franchises and 
had utilized that expertise in selecting the Pompano mall site; 
and (3) representing, without a reasonable basis in fact, that 
the food court common area maintenance fees at the Pompano mall 
would not exceed three percent of gross sales.  Moreover, as 
noted above, the jury also found that CSI and CSLC had been 
negligent in the manner in which they selected the Pompano mall 
location and in the manner in which they negotiated the terms of 
the lease for that location.   
10 
 Based on its findings, the jury awarded J & R Ice Cream 
$200,000 for California Smoothie's violations of the New Jersey 
Consumer Fraud Act, and $55,000 for California Smoothie's 
negligent conduct.  The $200,000 verdict was a lump sum which did 
not distinguish among the liability theories under the Consumer 
Fraud Act.  The court trebled the damages for the New Jersey 
Consumer Fraud Act violations pursuant to N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-
19 (West 1989), and, in a post-trial hearing, the court awarded J 
& R Ice Cream $287,455.83 in attorney's fees and costs.  However, 
the court struck the jury's award of $55,000 on the negligence 
count and refused to award J & R Ice Cream prejudgment interest 
on the verdict.  Thus, the total award to J & R Ice Cream as 
reflected in the court's order of judgment, was $887,455.83.  CSI 
and CSLC appeal from the judgment entered on July 20, 1993, on 
the jury's verdict, and J & R Ice Cream cross-appeals from the 
court's denial of prejudgment interest and its decision to strike 
the jury's award of negligence damages.  
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 A. An Overall View 
 The district court's jurisdiction was based upon 28 
U.S.C. § 1332.  Plaintiff J & R Ice Cream is a citizen of 
Florida, with its principal place of business in that state, the 
defendants CSI and CSLC are citizens of New Jersey with their 
principal places of business in that state, and the amount in 
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controversy exceeds $50,000.0  Our jurisdiction is based on 28 
U.S.C. § 636(c)(3) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291 inasmuch as this is an 
appeal from a final order of judgment in a trial presided over by 
a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). 
 California Smoothie challenges the jury's verdict on 
six grounds:  (1) that the court erred in admitting testimony by 
unrelated former California Smoothie franchisees as to 
misrepresentations California Smoothie made to them; (2) that the 
court erred in applying the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act to the 
sale and acquisition of a franchise; (3) that the proof that 
California Smoothie falsely represented that it had acquired 
expertise in selecting profitable locations for franchises and 
that it had utilized that expertise in selecting the Pompano mall 
site did not establish a violation of the Consumer Fraud Act; (4) 
that the evidence did not support the jury's finding that 
California Smoothie represented to Baugher and Rossetti that 
"they could expect gross sales of $250,000 and likely in excess 
of $300,000";0 (5) that the court erred in admitting parol 
                     
0The complaint stated that CSLC had "a" principal place of 
business in New Jersey, leaving open the possibility that it had 
"its" principal place of business in Florida.  Thus, the 
complaint did not properly plead diversity jurisdiction.  See 
Hunt v. Acromed Corp., 961 F.2d 1079, 1080, 1082 n.7 (3d Cir. 
1992).  However, letters and supporting material submitted to 
this court indicate that at the time the complaint was filed, 
CSLC's principal place of business was in New Jersey.  Therefore, 
we regard the jurisdictional problem as cured.  See 28 U.S.C. 
§1653.  Baugher and Rossetti, who were additional defendants on a 
counterclaim, are citizens of New York and Florida, respectively.  
0The quotation which we take from California Smoothie's brief is 
a paraphrase of J & R Ice Cream's complaint and of an 
interrogatory to the jury. 
12 
evidence of one of the three misrepresentations allegedly made by 
California Smoothie; and (6) that the court erred in concluding 
that California Smoothie had a duty to select a franchise site 
and negotiate a lease for Baugher and Rossetti. 
 For reasons which we set forth below, we conclude that 
the district court abused its discretion by permitting J & R Ice 
Cream to introduce the testimony by former California Smoothie 
franchisees who were unrelated to J & R Ice Cream and its 
founders.  Moreover, we find that the introduction of this 
evidence was prejudicial with regard to the Consumer Fraud Act 
count, a conclusion that standing alone would require a new trial 
on that count.   
 However, as we noted above, California Smoothie argues 
that the Consumer Fraud Act does not apply to the sale and 
acquisition of a franchise.  We agree.  Therefore, we will not 
remand for a new trial on the Consumer Fraud Act count.  Rather, 
we will remand the matter for entry of a judgment for California 
Smoothie on that count.  Nevertheless, we will remand this case 
to the district court for a hearing to determine whether J & R 
Ice Cream is entitled to a new trial on its equitable fraud 
claim, as J & R Ice Cream contended at oral argument before us 
that it only abandoned this cause of action after learning that 
the district court would not entertain motions for summary 
judgment and after it reasonably concluded that California 
Smoothie did not intend to challenge the Consumer Fraud Act's 
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applicability to this case.0  If the district court agrees with 
these factual contentions, it may deem it appropriate to 
reinstate the equitable fraud claim.  We will reinstate the 
jury's verdict against California Smoothie on the negligence 
count, as the testimony by former California Smoothie franchisees 
did not taint the judgment on this count, and the district court 
was correct in concluding that California Smoothie had a duty to 
select a franchise site and negotiate a lease for Baugher and 
Rossetti. 
 In its cross-appeal, J & R Ice Cream challenges the 
district court's denial of prejudgment interest on the Consumer 
Fraud Act damages and the court's decision to strike the jury's 
award of negligence damages because they were duplicative of the 
Consumer Fraud Act damages.  In light of our decision that the 
district court's admission of testimony by former franchisees 
requires reversal of the Consumer Fraud Act judgment and that the 
                     
0We recognize that in view of our conclusion that the Consumer 
Fraud Act does not apply to the sale of a franchise that we 
probably could avoid deciding the admissibility of the testimony 
of the former franchisees.  Nevertheless we reach that question 
because the evidence issue raises an important question of 
federal law which we think that we should decide.  In light of 
our decision, however, we need not reach California Smoothie's 
claims: that the proof that California Smoothie falsely 
represented that it had acquired expertise in selecting 
profitable locations for franchises and that it had utilized that 
expertise in selecting the Pompano mall site did not establish a 
violation of the Consumer Fraud Act; that the evidence did not 
support the jury's finding that California Smoothie represented 
to Baugher and Rossetti that "they could expect gross sales of 
$250,000 and likely in excess of $300,000"; and that the court 
erred under New Jersey law in admitting parol evidence of one of 
the three misrepresentations allegedly made by California 
Smoothie.  None of these claims raise important federal 
questions. 
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Consumer Fraud Act is inapplicable to the sale and acquisition of 
a franchise, we need not reach these claims and we will dismiss 
the cross-appeal as moot.0 
 Instead, we will vacate the district court's order 
striking the negligence damages and remand with instructions to 
reinstate the negligence damages, enter a judgment for them, and 
award prejudgment interest on these damages.  We follow this 
course because the district court concluded that the damages 
awarded on the negligence claim against California Smoothie 
duplicated the damages awarded on the Consumer Fraud Act claim 
against California Smoothie.  It reached this conclusion as it 
reasoned that "the damages which would proximately flow from a 
misrepresentation as to expertise in site selection and failure 
to utilize that expertise properly [are] the same damages which 
would flow from a negligence claim" based on California 
Smoothie's alleged negligence in selecting the site.  See supp. 
app. at 519.  For this reason, the district court refused to 
enter judgment on the $55,000 awarded by the jury on the 
                     
0CSI and CSLC have filed proceedings under Chapter 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Code but on November 29, 1993, they obtained an order 
from the bankruptcy court permitting them to continue this 
appeal.  They contend that the order does not allow J & R Ice 
Cream to prosecute its cross-appeal.  We need not consider this 
point because we are dismissing the cross-appeal.  While we 
recognize that we are requiring entry of a judgment in favor of J 
& R Ice Cream on the negligence claim, we do not reach that 
result by reversing on the cross-appeal.  Rather, we are 
remanding for entry of the judgment because we are reversing on 
California Smoothie's appeal and a consequence of that reversal 
is a reinstatement of the negligence verdict and the entry of a 
judgment thereon.  We do not regard that outcome as implicating 
the automatic stay.   
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negligence count.  Id. at 520; app. at 42-43 (order of judgment). 
Thus, the negligence damages should be reinstated because, based 
on our decision, they no longer are duplicative.0 
 Prejudgment interest should be allowed on the judgment 
on the negligence claim pursuant to N.J. Ct. R. 4:42-11(b) which 
provides that prejudgment interest shall be awarded in all but 
"exceptional" circumstances.  In reaching this conclusion, we 
have considered the district court's reasoning in disallowing 
interest on the Consumer Fraud Act judgment: 
 [u]nder the circumstances where a treble 
damage award is made to a prevailing 
plaintiff, . . . to additionally award 
prejudgment interest would in effect provide 
such a windfall and double recovery and this 
does indeed constitute exceptional 
circumstances. 
 
 As noted by counsel for plaintiff, the 
purpose behind the rule is twofold; to 
encourage settlement and to make the 
plaintiff whole.  In the situation where 
treble damages are awardable, the treble 
damages [are] more than adequate to make a 
plaintiff whole; and indeed the prospect of 
treble recovery is also more than adequate to 
make a defendant focus on settlement and 
encourage settlement. 
See supp. app. at 522.  But based on our decision that J & R Ice 
Cream is no longer entitled to treble damages, the district 
court's reasoning is no longer applicable.  Thus, J & R Ice Cream 
is entitled to prejudgment interest on the negligence damages 
pursuant to the ordinary application of N.J. Ct. R. 4:42-11(b).  
                     
0Of course, if the district court grants J & R Ice Cream a new 
trial on its equitable fraud claim and enters judgment against 
California Smoothie on this claim, a portion of the relief on the 
fraud claim may be duplicative of the negligence damages.  
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 B. The Testimony from Former Franchisees 
 California Smoothie objected to the admission of the 
testimony of former California Smoothie franchisees on multiple 
occasions.  See e.g., supp. app. at 13 (motion in limine), id. at 
283 (prior to testimony of former franchisees), id. at 505 
(charge conference), id. at 517-18 (post-trial motion). 
Nevertheless, J & R Ice Cream argues that we should not address 
California Smoothie's claim that the district court erred in 
admitting this testimony.  In this regard, J & R Ice Cream 
contends that even if the testimony was inadmissible for purposes 
of its Consumer Fraud Act claim, California Smoothie is barred 
from challenging the admission of this testimony on appeal, 
because the evidence was admissible for purposes of its equitable 
fraud claim and California Smoothie failed to request a limiting 
or curative instruction after J & R Ice Cream voluntarily 
dismissed its equitable fraud claim.  See br. at 23.  However, 
the record indicates that California Smoothie continued to object 
to the admission of the testimony after J & R Ice Cream dismissed 
its equitable fraud claim, see supp. app. at 505 (charge 
conference), that the district court continued to hold that the 
testimony was admissible, id. at 505 (charge conference), 517-18 
(post-trial motion), and that J & R Ice Cream capitalized on the 
admission of the testimony by arguing in its closing that the 
former franchisees's testimony regarding misrepresentations made 
to them by California Smoothie was evidence that California 
Smoothie made misrepresentations to Baugher and Rossetti, id. at 
17 
509.0  Thus, California Smoothie is not barred from challenging 
the admission of this testimony on appeal.   
 The district court allowed J & R Ice Cream to introduce 
testimony by two former California Smoothie franchisees, Jean 
Dunlop and Charles McRae, both of whom testified that California 
Smoothie made representations to them regarding the sales and 
profits a franchise would produce.  See id. at 280-355.  Although 
California Smoothie objected to this testimony, the district 
court ruled that it was admissible as evidence of "intent" and a 
"common plan or scheme."  Id. at 283, 307, 517-18.  Subsequently, 
during argument on the post-trial motions, the court stated that 
"it became clear at the charge conference" that intent was not an 
element of a Consumer Fraud Act violation, but it reiterated that 
the testimony of the two former franchisees was admissible as 
evidence of California's common plan or scheme or business 
                     
0Moreover, although J & R Ice Cream's brief refers to its non-
statutory fraud claim as a common law fraud claim, the complaint 
identifies it as an equitable fraud claim.  The testimony of the 
former franchisees was inadmissible for purposes of J & R Ice 
Cream's equitable fraud claim because although "[a] plaintiff 
asserting a claim of legal fraud must show that the defendant 
acted with scienter, . . . a plaintiff advancing a claim of 
equitable fraud need not demonstrate scienter."  Lightning Lube, 
Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1182-83 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(citations omitted) (applying New Jersey law).  Thus, for 
purposes of J & R Ice Cream's equitable fraud claim, the 
testimony of the former franchisees was not admissible as 
evidence of California Smoothie's intent.  Finally, our 
discussion below concluding that the testimony was not admissible 
as evidence of a "common plan" or "scheme" for purposes of the 
Consumer Fraud Act claim applies with equal force to the 
equitable fraud claim.  Thus, J & R Ice Cream's contention that 
the testimony of the former franchisees was admissible at the 
time it was introduced because J & R Ice Cream was still 
prosecuting its equitable fraud claim lacks merit. 
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practice of representing sales and profit figures to potential 
franchisees.  Id. at 517.   
 We review the district court's decision to admit 
testimony by former California Smoothie franchisees regarding 
California Smoothie's prior "bad acts" for abuse of discretion. 
See United States v. Console, 13 F.3d 641, 659 (3d Cir. 1993), 
cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1660 (1994).  As we indicated in Console, 
13 F.3d at 659 (quoting United States v. Sampson, 980 F.2d 883, 
886 (3d Cir. 1992)): 
[f]our guidelines set forth by the Supreme 
Court govern the admission of prior 'bad 
acts':  '(1) the evidence must have a proper 
purpose under Rule 404(b); (2) it must be 
relevant under Rule 402; (3) its probative 
value must outweigh its prejudicial effect 
under Rule 403; and (4) the court must charge 
the jury to consider the evidence only for 
the limited purpose for which it is 
admitted.' 
Rule 404(b) provides that: 
[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts 
is not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show action in conformity 
therewith.  It may, however, be admissible 
for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident. 
 The testimony given by Dunlop and McRae was not 
admissible as evidence of "intent" because, as the district court 
recognized subsequent to its initial ruling on the evidence, 
intent is not an essential element of a Consumer Fraud Act 
violation consisting of an affirmative act.  See Fenwick v. Kay 
American Jeep, Inc., 371 A.2d 13, 16 (N.J. 1977); D'Ercole Sales, 
Inc. v. Fruehauf Corp., 501 A.2d 990, 996 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
19 
Div. 1985).  There is no doubt that the alleged Consumer Fraud 
Act violations in this case consist of affirmative 
misrepresentations.   
 Moreover, the testimony was not admissible as evidence 
of a "common plan or scheme."   
Ordinarily, when courts speak of 'common plan 
or scheme,' they are referring to a situation 
in which the charged and the uncharged . . . 
[acts] are parts of a single series of 
events.  In this context, evidence that the 
defendant was involved in the uncharged . . . 
[act] may tend to show a motive for the 
charged . . . [act] and hence establish the 
commission of the . . . [act], the identity 
of the actor, or his intention.   
Government of the Virgin Islands v. Pinney, 967 F.2d 912, 916 (3d 
Cir. 1992) (citing Edward W. Cleary et al., McCormick on Evidence 
§ 190, at 559 (3d ed. 1984)).  Alternatively a "common plan or 
scheme" may consist of "incidents [that] were sufficiently 
similar to earmark them as the handiwork of the same actor," and 
thus constitute "'signature evidence'" of identity.  Id.0  "With 
the possible exception of prosecutions for conspiracy, plan or 
design is not an element of the offense; therefore, evidence that 
                     
0This method of proving identity through the use of other bad 
acts is "sometimes labelled proof of 'modus operandi'" and 
distinguished from the use of a common plan or scheme to prove 
identity.  See 22 Wright and Graham, Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 5244, at 501 (1978). 
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shows a plan must be relevant to some ultimate issue in the 
case."  See 22 Wright and Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure 
§ 5244, at 500-01 (1978).   
 Dunlop and McRae testified that California Smoothie 
made representations to them regarding the sales and profits they 
would achieve if they acquired franchises.  This testimony was 
not relevant to an ultimate issue in this case, such as motive, 
identity or intent.  These issues were not in dispute.  See 
Pinney, 967 F.2d at 917.  Furthermore, the testimony was not 
germane to the negligence count.  Therefore, the evidence was 
admitted for "exactly the purpose Rule 404(b) declared to be 
improper," id., namely to establish the defendants' propensity to 
commit the charged act.  See United States v. Jemal, No. 93-5172, 
slip op. at 8 (3d Cir. June 21, 1994).  The district court 
acknowledged that it admitted the former franchisees' testimony 
for this purpose, stating: "in the context of this case, I 
believe that it was proper to show that it was more likely that 
representations of sales figures were made to . . . [J & R Ice 
Cream] by demonstrating that the officials of California Smoothie 
had a practice of making such representations."  See supp. app. 
at 518.  Thus, the district court abused its discretion in 
admitting this testimony for an improper purpose. 
 Although J & R Ice Cream contends that the testimony 
was harmless because it was cumulative and accounted for only 
half an hour of a two-week trial, see br. at 28-29, we conclude 
that the testimony was prejudicial because it portrayed 
California Smoothie as an organization engaged in a large-scale 
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scheme to defraud prospective franchisees by using 
misrepresentations to persuade them to acquire franchises.0 
Although the testimony of the former franchisees only addressed 
representations made by California Smoothie regarding the sales 
and profits that a franchise would produce, we are satisfied that 
the testimony prejudiced California Smoothie on the two aspects 
of the Consumer Fraud Act verdict which the testimony did not 
address directly, the representations with respect to California 
Smoothie's expertise in site selection and the representation 
regarding the limitation on the maintenance charges.  We take 
this view because we believe that the jury could have used the 
highly prejudicial, indeed almost inflammatory evidence to 
conclude that California Smoothie used misrepresentations in 
multiple aspects of its sales efforts.  At the very least, we 
cannot say with any confidence that it is highly probable that 
the error did not substantially affect California Smoothie's 
rights on all the Consumer Fraud Act issues.  See Lippay v. 
Christos, 996 F.2d 1490, 1500 (3d Cir. 1993).  Thus, the district 
court's abuse of discretion requires reversal of the judgment 
against California Smoothie on the Consumer Fraud Act count.   
                     
0Moreover, as we noted above, J & R Ice Cream used the testimony 
of the former franchisees to support this inference in its 
closing argument, stating, "Did Mr. Keilt make representations to 
them that they would make specific numbers, whether it be 320 to 
350, which I believe was Miss Dunlop's testimony and I think Mr. 
McRae would make $300,000.  That's all that's relevant.  From 
that you can deduce that he probably made the same or similar 
representations to Mr. Baugher and Mr. Rossetti."  See supp. app. 
at 509. 
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 The admission of this testimony does not, however, 
require reversal of the judgment against California Smoothie on 
the negligence count because the evidence of California 
Smoothie's alleged misrepresentations was quite distinct from the 
evidence supporting the jury's determination that California 
Smoothie was negligent in its selection of a franchise site and 
negotiation of a Pompano mall lease.  We also point out that 
there was sufficient evidence supporting this determination.0    
  
 C. Applicability of the Consumer Fraud Act 
 California Smoothie argues that the district court 
erred in applying the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act to the sale 
and acquisition of a franchise because: (1) purchasers of a 
franchise are not the "ordinary consumers" that the Act was 
intended to protect, and (2) a sale of a franchise does not 
qualify as either a sale of real estate or a sale of merchandise, 
the only two types of transactions to which the Act applies.  J & 
R Ice Cream answers that California Smoothie should be barred 
from challenging the applicability of the New Jersey Consumer 
Fraud Act to this case because "[t]he first time this issue was 
raised was by way of post-trial motion."  See br. at 15.   
 However, we are satisfied that California Smoothie 
preserved its objection to the applicability of the Act.  As the 
                     
0Moreover, in determining that the district court was correct in 
finding that California Smoothie assumed the duty to select a 
franchise site and negotiate a lease for Baugher and Rossetti, we 
do not rely on the evidence of California Smoothie's 
misrepresentations to other former franchisees. 
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district court declined to entertain motions for summary 
judgment, California Smoothie objected to the Act's application 
to the case in its trial brief, see trial br. at 34 n.9, and 
cited its trial brief as the basis for its motion for a judgment 
as a matter of law at the conclusion of J & R Ice Cream's case. 
Moreover, at the post-trial motions hearing, the district court 
rejected on the merits California Smoothie's argument that the 
Consumer Fraud Act improperly was applied to the case, stating to 
counsel for J & R Ice Cream, "your waiver argument . . . is made 
very clear.  I just, in fact, preferred to decide this on the 
merits rather than dealing with the waiver issue."  Thus, its 
treatment of the argument suggests that the district court did 
not believe that California Smoothie had waived the argument. See 
Griffiths v. CIGNA Corp., 988 F.2d 457, 468 n.8 (3d Cir.) 
("because the district court acknowledged during oral argument on 
the appellants [sic] post-trial motions that the 'contention 
about the, but for charge, I think that was reasonably well 
preserved' . . . , we will consider the appellants' exception to 
the retaliatory discharge instruction on the merits"), cert. 
denied, 114 S.Ct. 186 (1993); see also Lippay v. Christos, 996 
F.2d at 1497 n.8 ("we are satisfied from our review of the record 
that . . . [appellant] objected on the ground of hearsay at the 
time of the testimony.  Furthermore, the district court noted in 
its opinion denying . . . [appellant's] motion for a new trial 
that although 'defendant's counsel objected somewhat belatedly to 
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the admission of this testimony, [he] nevertheless preserved his 
objection on the record'").0 
 The Consumer Fraud Act provides in relevant part that: 
[t]he act, use or employment by any person of 
any unconscionable commercial practice, 
deception, fraud, false pretense, false 
promise, misrepresentation, or the knowing 
concealment, suppression, or omission of any 
material fact with intent that others rely 
upon such concealment, suppression, or 
omission, in connection with the sale or 
advertisement of any merchandise or real 
estate, or with the subsequent performance of 
such person as aforesaid, whether or not any 
person has in fact been misled, deceived or 
damaged thereby, is declared to be an 
unlawful practice. 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-2 (West 1989).  The Act defines 
"merchandise" to include "any objects, wares, goods, commodities, 
services or anything offered, directly or indirectly to the 
public for sale."  See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-1(c) (West 1989). 
It defines "person" to include "any natural person or his legal 
representative, partnership, corporation, company, trust, 
business entity or association, and any agent, employee, 
salesman, partner, officer, director, member, stockholder, 
                     
0We also point out that the district court's case management 
techniques with respect to declining to entertain motions for 
summary judgment may have interfered with California Smoothie's 
ability to raise its objection to the applicability of the 
Consumer Fraud Act.  Furthermore, it is possible that inasmuch as 
we are reversing the judgment on the Consumer Fraud Act claim 
because the court erroneously admitted prejudicial evidence from 
the former franchisees, California Smoothie might have been able 
to raise the issue of the applicability of the Act on remand if 




associate, trustee or cestuis que trustent thereof."  See N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 56:8-1(d) (West 1989).   
 The parties have not cited any Supreme Court of New 
Jersey cases addressing the application of the Act to the sale 
and acquisition of franchises.  In fact, we are aware of only one 
case, Morgan v. Air Brook Limousine, Inc., 510 A.2d 1197 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1986), which has addressed the question 
explicitly.  Morgan involved an agreement between Air Brook 
Limousine and Morgan, providing that Morgan would lease a 
limousine from Air Brook and accept only limousine rides referred 
to him by Air Brook.  Morgan later filed suit against Air Brook, 
alleging inter alia, that Air Brook violated the Consumer Fraud 
Act.  Air Brook moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Act 
applied only to retail consumer sales or advertising and that a 
franchise did not qualify as merchandise under the Act.   
 However, the court rejected these arguments and held 
that the Act applied to the agreement.  The court concluded that 
because the Act's definition of "person" includes business 
entities and the Act contains no "retail restriction" or 
definition of the term "consumer," the "Act is not restricted to 
retail consumer consumption transactions and its protective sweep 
includes transactions in which a person, like Morgan, makes an 
investment rather than a consumption purchase."  Morgan, id.  The 
court also concluded that "[a]lthough the term 'franchise' is not 
included within § 1(c)'s definition of 'merchandise,' it is 
subsumed within the terms 'commodities', 'services' or 'anything 
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offered, directly or indirectly to the public for sale.'"  Id. at 
1204. 
 We also consider a second inferior court case, Kugler 
v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 293 A.2d 682 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. 
Div. 1972), which involved practices used by a cosmetics 
manufacturer to recruit distributors for the cosmetics and to 
promote the sale of distributorships.  The Koscot court held the 
"referral or pyramid sales practice" employed by the cosmetics 
manufacturer violated the Consumer Fraud Act as did the 
misrepresentations made to prospective cosmetics distributors. 
Id. at 691-92.  Thus, the Koscot court applied the Consumer Fraud 
Act to the sale and acquisition of cosmetics distributorships. 
However, the court did so without analysis of the definition of 
"merchandise" under the Act or reference to the Act's underlying 
purpose.   
 We are exercising plenary review over the legal issue 
of whether the Consumer Fraud Act is applicable.  Nonetheless, 
"'in the absence of any indication that the highest state court 
would rule otherwise,'" we must attribute "'significant weight'" 
to the decisions by the lower state courts.  Nationwide Mut. Ins. 
Co. v. Budd-Baldwin, 947 F.2d 1098, 1101 n.6 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(quoting Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 759 F.2d 271, 273-74 
(3d Cir. 1985)).  In this case, however, we see many indications 
that the Supreme Court of New Jersey would not adopt the 
reasoning in Morgan or apply the result in Koscot, and thus we 
reject a construction of the Consumer Fraud Act's definition of 
"merchandise" that would include franchises.  See Dillinger v. 
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Caterpillar, Inc., 959 F.2d 430, 435 n.11 (3d Cir. 1992) ("In 
deciding this case [under Pennsylvania law] we must give due 
consideration to the decisional law of inferior state courts but 
we need not give those decisions binding effect.  A decision of 
'an intermediate appellate state court . . . is a datum for 
ascertaining state law which is not to be disregarded by a 
federal court unless it is convinced by other persuasive data 
that the highest court of the state would decide otherwise'") 
(quoting West v. American Telephone & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 
237, 61 S.Ct. 179, 183 (1940)).  See also Blanding v. 
Pennsylvania State Police, 12 F.3d 1303, 1306 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 As the Supreme Court of New Jersey stated in Daaleman 
v. Elizabethtown Gas Co., 390 A.2d 566, 568 (N.J. 1978), the 
Consumer Fraud Act was "aimed basically at unlawful sales and 
advertising practices designed to induce consumers to purchase 
merchandise or real estate."  "[T]he legislative concern 
[underlying the Act] was over sharp practices and dealings in the 
marketing of merchandise and real estate whereby the consumer 
could be victimized by being lured into a purchase through 
fraudulent, deceptive or other similar kind of selling or 
advertising practices."  Id. at 569.  Based on this understanding 
of the purpose of the Act, the court in Daaleman held that the 
Act did not apply to a privately owned public utility company's 
alleged overstatement of the costs and quantity of gas it 
purchased, although the overstatement was reflected in the 
monthly bills sent to its customers.  We recognize that, as J & R 
Ice Cream points out, this holding also was based on the court's 
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conclusion that inasmuch as the utility operated under the 
jurisdiction of the Board of Public Utility Commissioners of the 
State of New Jersey (the "PUC"), "the subject matter of 
plaintiff's complaint . . . [was] within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of PUC."  Id. at 570.  This distinction, however, 
does not undercut the Supreme Court's conclusion that the Act was 
designed to protect consumers. 
 Moreover, in an earlier case holding that house-to-
house sales of books at an "exorbitant price" was "a fraud . . . 
within the contemplation" of the Consumer Fraud Act, Kugler v. 
Romain, 279 A.2d 640, 653-54 (N.J. 1971), the Supreme Court cited 
the following statement from the legislative history of the Act: 
[t]he purpose of this bill is to permit the 
Attorney General to combat the increasingly 
widespread practice of defrauding the 
consumer.  The authority conferred will 
provide effective machinery to investigate 
and prohibit deceptive and fraudulent 
advertising and selling practices which have 
caused extensive damage to the public. 
Id. at 653 (emphasis added).  This statement of the Act's purpose 
and the Supreme Court's reading of the Act in Daaleman both 
indicate that although the Consumer Fraud Act does not define the 
term "consumer" or contain an explicit "retail restriction," it 
was intended to protect persons engaging in "consumer" 
transactions, not those acquiring businesses. 
 The New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, 
adopted this reading of the Act in Neveroski v. Blair, 358 A.2d 
473 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976), abrogated by Arroyo v. 
Arnold-Baker & Assocs., Inc., 502 A.2d 106 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law 
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Div. 1985) (abrogating Neveroski in light of the 1976 amendment 
adding "the sale or advertisement of . . . real estate" to the 
provisions of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-2 (West 1989)).  Neveroski 
involved a suit by a home buyer against his real estate broker, 
the seller of his home, and the termite exterminator, all of whom 
allegedly concealed the termite damage at the home he purchased. 
At the time of the sale, the Consumer Fraud Act did not include 
the term "real estate," and thus the Neveroski court was 
confronted with the question of whether the term "merchandise" 
included real estate.  The court held that the phrase "anything 
offered, directly or indirectly, to the public for sale", which 
is included in the Act's definition of "merchandise," was not a 
"catch-all phrase" which included real estate, but instead should 
be "construed under the doctrine of ejusdem generis as a 
comprehensive definition intended to incorporate other products 
or services similar in nature to those enumerated by the specific 
words" which precede it.  Id. at 480. 
 The court based its holding in part on its  
considered opinion that the entire thrust of 
the Consumer Fraud Act is pointed to products 
and services sold to consumers in the popular 
sense.  Such consumers purchase products from 
retail sellers of merchandise consisting of 
personal property of all kinds or contract 
for services of various types brought to 
their attention by advertising or other sales 
techniques.  The legislative language 
throughout the statute and the evils sought 
to be eliminated point to an intent to 
protect the consumer in the context of the 
ordinary meaning of that term in the market 
place. 
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Id. (first emphasis added).  Moreover, construing the definition 
of the term "merchandise" under the doctrine of ejusdem generis, 
the court concluded that real estate did not qualify as 
"merchandise" under the Act because it "is not included in the 
definition of the products encompassed by the act, nor is it a 
commodity which can be considered included within the more 
general statutory language" of the definition.  Id. at 481.  The 
court concluded that real estate was not covered by the phrase 
"anything offered, directly or indirectly, to the public for 
sale," because "[r]eal estate is wholly foreign to any of the 
listed examples specifically referred to in the definition."  Id. 
at 480.   
 Like the Supreme Court in Daaleman and Romain, and the 
Appellate Division in Neveroski, we conclude that the term 
"merchandise" must be construed in light of the overriding 
purpose of the Act, which was "to protect the consumer in the 
context of the ordinary meaning of that term in the market 
place."  Neveroski, 358 A.2d at 480 (emphasis added).  The 
ordinary meaning of the consumer in the marketplace does not 
include a purchaser of a franchise.  Moreover, like "real 
estate," "franchises" are not included expressly in the Act's 
definition of "merchandise" and are "wholly foreign to any of the 
listed examples specifically referred to in the definition."  Id. 
It is true that on January 19, 1976, the New Jersey Legislature 
amended section 2 of the Consumer Fraud Act to bar the enumerated 
practices "'in connection with the sale or advertisement of any 
merchandise or real estate.'"  Id. at 479 n.3 (emphasis added). 
31 
See Arroyo v. Arnold-Baker & Assocs., Inc., 502 A.2d at 107-08. 
However, the legislature has not amended the Act to cover 
franchises.  Thus, we hold that J & R Ice Cream is not entitled 
to a new trial on its Consumer Fraud Act claim because the Act 
does not apply to the sale and acquisition of a franchise.0 
 We realize that, as the court in Morgan noted, the 
Consumer Fraud Act's definition of "person" includes business 
entities.  Thus, as the court concluded in BOC Group, Inc. v. 
Lummus Crest, Inc., 597 A.2d 1109, 1112-13 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law 
Div. 1990), "[i]t is clear that a corporation may qualify as a 
person under the Act when it finds itself in a consumer oriented 
situation," id., such as when it acts as the purchaser of a tow 
truck, D'Ercole Sales, Inc. v. Fruehauf Corp., 501 A.2d 990, 996-
97 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985), as the purchaser of a yacht, 
Perth Amboy Iron Works, Inc. v. American Home Assur. Co., 543 
A.2d 1020, 1024-25 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988), aff'd, 571 
A.2d 294 (N.J. 1990), or as the purchaser of computer 
                     
0In its brief J & R Ice Cream argues without citation of 
authority that "[s]ince the inducement of [J & R Ice Cream by 
California Smoothie] also involved inducing [J & R Ice Cream] 
into taking the lease for real property at Pompano, this stands 
as an independent justification for application of the Act to 
this transaction."  Br. at 37 n.6.  While there is authority for 
the application of the Act to a lease, 316 49 St. Assocs. Ltd. 
Partnership v. Galvez, 635 A.2d 1013, 1019 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1994), in our view this authority is not applicable here 
because the sublease was merely incidental to the basic 
relationship between the franchisee, J & R Ice Cream, and the 
franchisor, California Smoothie.  Thus, if J & R Ice Cream had 
not acquired a franchise there would not have been a sublease. 
See BOC Group, Inc. v. Lummus Crest, Inc., 397 A.2d 1109, 1112 
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1990) (services collateral to sale of 
technology not subject to Act). 
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peripherals, Hundred East Credit Corp. v. Eric Schuster Corp., 
515 A.2d 246, 247-49 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), certif. denied, 
526 A.2d 146 (N.J. 1986).  See also Coastal Group, Inc. v. Dryuit 
Systems, Inc.,     A.2d    , No. A-5028-92T5 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. June 23, 1994) (purchase by corporation of 
prefabricated panels for exterior wall system for condominium 
project subject to Consumer Fraud Act).  However, we conclude 
that when an individual or a corporation purchases a franchise, 
it is not a person in a "consumer oriented situation," and thus 
the transaction is not covered by the Act.  In short, it is the 
character of the transaction rather than the identity of the 
purchaser which determines if the Consumer Fraud Act is 
applicable.  See, e.g., Daaleman, 390 A.2d at 570 (concurring 
opinion) (a utility may be subject to Consumer Fraud Act when it 
sells merchandise though it is not subject to the Act in making 
computations for monthly service bills).   
 The BOC Group court's decision that a corporation that 
purchased technology and certain support services through an 
"Engineering Services Agreement and Licensing Agreement" was not 
protected by the Consumer Fraud Act in that transaction supports 
our decision.  The court based its decision on the "'need to 
place reasonable limits upon the operation of the Act . . . so 
that its enforcement properly reflects legislative intent,'" id. 
at 1112 (quoting DiBernardo v. Mosley, 502 A.2d 1166, 1167 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div.), certif. denied, 511 A.2d 673 (N.J. 1986)), 
and the conclusion that the term "merchandise" did not apply to 
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the technology and services acquired in BOC Group, id. at 1112-
13.   
 The court determined that the technology and services 
acquired in BOC Group were not merchandise because they were not 
"available to the public at large and sold in large quantities" 
or "mass produced."  Id. at 1113.  The court also based its 
conclusion on the rules promulgated by the New Jersey Division of 
Consumer Affairs pursuant to the Consumer Fraud Act, N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 56:8-4 (West 1989).  See BOC Group, 597 A.2d at 1113.  "In 
developing these rules, the Division of Consumer Affairs 
identified 21 types of consumer transactions for goods and/or 
services ranging from defective automobile parts to the sale of 
meat and health club services."  Id.  See N.J. Admin, Code tit. 
13, § 45A-1, et seq.  Construing the rules under the doctrine of 
ejusdem generis, the court concluded that the technology and 
services acquired in BOC Group bore "no similarity whatsoever to 
any of these 21 comprehensive definitions," and thus were not 
covered by the Act.  Id.   
 We conclude that even where franchises or 
distributorships are available to the public at large in the same 
sense as are trucks, boats or computer peripherals, they are not 
covered by the Consumer Fraud Act because they are businesses, 
not consumer goods or services.  They never are purchased for 
consumption.0  Instead, they are purchased for the present value 
                     
0As the court in Hundred East Credit Corp. stated, the "generally 
recognized meaning [of the term 'consumer'] is 'one who uses 
(economic) goods, and so diminishes or destroys their 
utilities.'"  515 A.2d at 248 (quoting Webster's New 
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of the cash flows they are expected to produce in the future and, 
like the technology and services acquired in BOC Group, bear no 
resemblance to the commodities and services listed in the 
statutory definition of "merchandise" or the rules promulgated by 
the Division of Consumer Affairs.0  Thus, J & R Ice Cream is not 
entitled to a new trial on its Consumer Fraud Act claim. 
  
 D. The Negligence Count 
 The district court deferred ruling on a motion in 
limine regarding whether California Smoothie had a duty to select 
a franchise site and negotiate a lease for Baugher and Rossetti. 
See supp. app. at 12.  Subsequently, the district court ruled 
that California Smoothie had assumed this duty,0 and instructed 
the jury accordingly, see id. at 511-12.  While California 
Smoothie, citing Rustay v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 775 F. Supp. 
161, 163 (D.N.J. 1991), concedes that the court was required to 
                                                                  
International Dictionary, 2d edition).  Under this definition, 
the purchaser of a franchise does not qualify as a "consumer" 
because its use of the franchise does not "diminish" or "destroy" 
the franchise's "utilities."  We point out, however, that some 
consumer goods may not be diminished or destroyed through use and 
that our result is not dependent on the acceptance of this 
definition. 
0In BOC Group the court suggested that the sale of "franchises" 
could be subject to the Consumer Fraud Act.  597 A.2d at 1112.  
But this statement was not necessary to its opinion and 
apparently the court included it because it had cited Morgan 
which it did not find controlling.  Thus, we do not find the 
reference to franchises in BOC Group to be significant. 
0Neither party has pointed us to the precise point in the record 
reflecting this ruling, but both parties proceed on the basis 
that the court made it. 
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determine whether it had the duty, it urges that the court erred 
in its conclusion.   
 California Smoothie makes a strong paper argument that 
its relationship with Baugher and Rossetti, and thus with J & R 
Ice Cream as their assignee, was primarily contractual as it was 
based on the Site Selection Agreement and the Franchise 
Agreement.  See br. at 42-43.  The Site Selection Agreement 
provides that California Smoothie grants Baugher and Rossetti 
"the right to obtain a Franchise to establish and operate a 
Restaurant if . . . [they] (a) identif[y] a specific location for 
the restaurant within the Assigned Area and (b) obtain[] the 
Franchisor's approval of the site."  See app. at 179-80.  Thus, 
Baugher and Rossetti were contractually responsible for proposing 
a site, and California Smoothie retained the right to reject the 
proposed site based on certain criteria identified in the 
agreement.  The agreement also provides that within 30 days of 
California Smoothie's approval of the site, Baugher and Rossetti 
must negotiate a lease for the site, and that this lease must be 
approved in writing by California Smoothie.  Id.  Finally, the 
agreement provides that upon request from Baugher and Rossetti, 
California Smoothie will provide "any additional guidelines and 
reasonable site selection assistance and counseling."  Id.  Thus, 
the Site Selection Agreement does not impose a duty on California 
Smoothie to select a site for Baugher and Rossetti or to 
negotiate a lease for their site.   
 However, even where a relationship is "essentially 
contractual [in] nature," a party may be "subject to a negligence 
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action if the 'act complained of was the direct result of duties 
voluntarily assumed . . . in addition to the mere contract.'" 
Walker Rogge, Inc. v. Chelsea Title & Guar. Co., 562 A.2d 208, 
221 (N.J. 1989) (quoting Brown's Tie & Lumber v. Chicago Title 
Co., 764 P.2d 423, 426 (Idaho 1988)); see also Gudnestad v. 
Seaboard Coal Dock Co., 99 A.2d 201, 204 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1953), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 104 
A.2d 313 (N.J. 1954) ("[i]t is undoubtedly the established rule 
of law that one who in the absence of a legal obligation to do so 
voluntarily undertakes to render a service for the protection of 
the safety of another may become liable to him for the failure to 
perform or the failure to exercise reasonable care in the 
performance of that service, although the volunteer is not the 
owner or in control of the property with respect to which the 
service is to be performed").  As the district court concluded, 
the record indicates that the site selection and lease 
negotiation processes did not follow the pattern described in the 
Site Selection Agreement.  California Smoothie concedes that it 
already had selected the Pompano mall site and negotiated a lease 
for the site prior to the execution of the Site Selection 
Agreement.  See br. at 43 n.42.   
 Moreover, the evidence indicates that when California 
Smoothie selected and leased the Pompano mall site: (1) 
California Smoothie intended to sublease it to a prospective 
franchisee, see supp. app. at 137; and (2) already had begun 
negotiations with Baugher and Rossetti regarding their 
acquisition of a franchise in Florida and suggested the Pompano 
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mall site to them.  The evidence also indicates that Keilt made a 
deliberate decision not to include Baugher and Rossetti in 
negotiations for the lease, see supp. app. at 383-84.  Thus, we 
conclude that the district court did not err in holding that 
California Smoothie assumed a duty to select the Pompano mall 
site for Baugher and Rossetti and to negotiate the lease for 
them.  As a result, we will affirm and reinstate the jury's 
verdict on the negligence count and will remand the matter to the 




 In view of the foregoing discussion, we will reverse 
the judgment of July 20, 1993, in favor of J & R Ice Cream on the 
Consumer Fraud Act count and will remand the matter to the 
district court for entry of a judgment in favor of CSI and CSLC 
on that count and for entry of a judgment for $55,000 in favor of 
J & R Ice Cream on the negligence count with prejudgment interest 
up to and including July 20, 1993.0  Thereafter interest shall 
accrue on the judgment.  See Fed. R. App. P. 37.  On the remand, 
                     
0In its brief, California Smoothie does not ask for any relief 
with respect to the attorney's fee awarded in the judgment 
entered July 20, 1993, to J & R Ice Cream under N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§56:8-19 (West 1989).  Consequently, we do not deal with those 
fees even though the basis for them has been eliminated.  Of 
course, we do not preclude California Smoothie from moving under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) for an order vacating the fees.  We also 
note that California Smoothie indicates that "[a]s a result of 
the jury's finding, the jury was not permitted to consider CSLC's 
counterclaims, which were dismissed."  CSLC does not seek a 
reinstatement of the counterclaims, and thus we do not consider 
them. 
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J & R Ice Cream may move for reinstatement of its equitable fraud 
claim.  J & R Ice Cream's cross-appeal from the denial of 
prejudgment interest on the Consumer Fraud Act judgment and from 
the striking of its judgment based on negligence is dismissed as 
moot.  The parties will bear their own costs on this appeal. 
 
 
      
